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INTRODUCTION

The distress warrant and trial of right of property are two venerable writ remedies still having practical application for the modern
Texas creditor.1 The 1972 United States Supreme Court opinion
*

B.A., Texas A&M University, 1962; J.D., University of Texas, 1967. Attorney at Law,

San Antonio, Texas; Member, Supreme Court of Texas Advisory Committee on Rules of
Civil Procedure.
** B.A., Marietta College, 1965; M.A., English, 1969; J.D., St. Mary's University School
of Law, expected May, 1981.
1. The distress warrant remedy is available by virtue of Tax. REv. CiV. STAT. ANN. arts.
5227, 5239 (Vernon 1962); Tax. R. Civ. P. 610-620. Trial of right of property is available
under Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 7409, 7417, 7418 (Vernon 1960); Tax. R. Civ. P. 717-

736.
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in Fuentes v. Shevin, 2 however, cast serious doubt on the constitutionality of the extraordinary writ remedies available under Texas
law.3 In 1979, amendments to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure
governing attachment, sequestation, and garnishment freed these
writ remedies from constitutional attack under Fuentes and its
progeny." Two other sections of the Texas rules dealing with distress warrants and trial of right of property, however, were in need
of revision to correct constitutional deficiencies under the due process clause. 5 The 1981 rules, recently adopted by the Supreme
Court of Texas, were promulgated to fulfill the procedural due process requirements applicable to distress warrants and trial of right
of property.' This article reviews the function and application of
those remedies and analyzes the recent revisions of the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure.
II.

DISTRESS WARRANTS

A distress warrant is a statutory remedy created for the purpose
of giving landlords a summary method of enforcing statutory liens
2. 407 U.S. 67 (1972). The Court found a Florida replevin statute, permitting ex parte
prejudgment seizure by one person, of property owned or possessed by another, to be violative of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 92-93.
3. The similarity of the Texas attachment procedure with that of the Florida practice
held unconstitutional in Fuentes raised questions as to the legitimacy of the Texas writ
remedy laws. See Soules, Attachment, Sequestration,and Garnishment:The 1977 Rules, 32
Sw. L.J. 753, 753 (1978); cf. Stevenson v. Cullen Center, Inc., 525 S.W.2d 731, 735 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.) 1975, no writ) (Texas distress warrant procedure unconstitutional in lacking proper due process protections including prompt post-seizure hearing).
1 4. See Tax. R. Civ. P. 592-609 (attachment); TEx. R. Civ. P. 696-716 (sequestration);
TEx. R. Civ. P. 658-679 (garnishment). The decision in Fuentes v. Shevin was explained and
modified in two Supreme Court decisions that followed. In Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416
U.S. 600 (1974), the Court, withdrawing significantly from the language in Fuentes, weighed
the property interests of the creditor against the interests of the debtor in upholding a Louisiana statute affording the debtor certain protective rights. Id. at 607. Later in North Georgia Finishing,Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975), the Court proposed specific standards for fourteenth amendment due process compliance in prejudgment seizures. Id. at
611-12 (Powell, J., concurring).
5. The rules dealing with distress warrants and trial of right of property similar to the
former rules of attachment, sequestration, and garnishment did not afford sufficient considerations of due process. See Stevenson v. Cullen Center, Inc., 525 S.W.2d 731, 735 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.) 1975, no writ); Soules, Attachment, Sequestration, Garnishment: The 1977 Rules, 32 Sw. L.J. 753, 770-76 (1978).
6. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 610-620 (distress warrant); TEx. R. Civ. P. 717-736 (trial of right
of property).
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on certain property of their tenants. At English common law, the
landlord himself executed the distress, took the tenant's property
into his possession, and retained it as security until the tenant's
debt was paid. A 1689 English statute8 gave the landlord the right
to sell the property unless it was replevied within five days, at
which time the tenant's right to replevy ceased.9 In Texas, the statutory distress warrant was first created by the Seventh Congress of
the Texas Republic in 1843, as article 1271, "An Act Concerning

Rents." 10 Texas courts have repeatedly stated that the purpose of
the distraint statutes is to provide a landlord with a "speedy and
effective" or "simple and inexpensive" means of preserving his lien
until suit to foreclose that lien can be filed and prosecuted to
judgment."'1
A.

The Landlord's Liens

Landlord's liens are created by articles 5222, 5238, and 5236d of
the Texas Revised Civil Statutes."2 They exist independent of the
distress warrant remedy;' 8 and arise from the landlord-tenant relationship." A landlord's lien continues in the affected property for
the period of time provided by the statute and is not affected by
7. See Bourcier v. Edmondson, 58 Tex. 675, 678 (1883).
8. The Distress for Rent Act, 1689, 2 Will. & Mar., c. 5, § 1.
9. Gollehon v. Porter, 161 S.W.2d 134, 137 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1942, writ ref'd
w.o.m.).
10. See 1843 Tex. Gen. Laws, An Act Concerning Rents, at 41, 2 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF
TEXAS 861 (1898).
11. See, e.g., McKee v. Sims, 92 Tex. 51, 53, 45 S.W. 564, 565 (1898); Keep 'Em Eating
Co. v. Hulings, 165 S.W.2d 211, 213 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1942, no writ); Webb v. Bergin,
38 S.W.2d 841, 842 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1931, writ dism'd).
12. See TEx. Rav. CIv. STAT. ANN. art 5222 (Vernon 1962) (creating "landlord's lien" in

property of lessee of agricultural land); id. art. 5238 (creating "owners of buildings lien" in
non-exempt property of lessee of "any residence, storehouse, or other building"); id. art.
5236d (Vernon Supp. 1980) (creating "landlord's lien for rent" in non-exempt property of
lessee of a dwelling). See generally id. arts. 5222-5239 (Vernon 1962); id. art. 5236d (Vernon
Supp. 1980-1981); Tax. R. Civ. P. 610-620. Section 1 of article 5236d, the "landlord's lien for
rent," does not actually create a new lien, since landlords of residential property were already protected by the "owners of buildings lien" under article 5238. See notes 33-36 infra
and accompanying text.
13. See Marsalis v. Pitman, 68 Tex. 624, 626, 5 S.W. 404, 405 (1887); Templeman v.
Gresham, 61 Tex. 50, 52 (1884); Webb v. Bergin, 38 S.W.2d 841, 842 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1931, writ dism'd).
14. See Gillet v. Talley, 60 S.W.2d 868, 870 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1933, no writ);
Stoma v. Filgo, 26 S.W.2d 1100, 1102 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1930, no writ).
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failure to obtain a distress warrant or by the wrongful suing out of
a writ to obtain a distress warrant.' 5 The right to a distress warrant, on the other hand, is dependent upon the existence of a statutory landlord's lien and continues only so long as the lien exists."
Additionally, when a contractual landlord's lien is provided for in a
lease, a landlord may protect his security interest in his tenant's
possessions situated on the leased premises by obtaining a distress
17
warrant, but only under conditions allowed by the statutes.
B.

Conditions for Obtaining Warrant

Aside from the existence of a statutory landlord's lien, the other
conditions required before a landlord may obtain a distress warrant are set out in the distress warrant statutes.' s Article 5227 of
the Texas Revised Civil Statutes, creating the remedy for lessors of
agricultural land, establishes three situations under which the warrant may be obtained. The remedy is available when any rent or
advances of money or of "the value of all animals, tools, provisions
and supplies furnished or caused to be furnished by the landlord to

15. Webb v. Bergin, 38 S.W.2d 841, 842 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1931, writ dism'd).
16. See Marsalis v. Pitman, 68 Tex. 624, 626-29, 5 S.W.404, 405-06 (1887) (landlord's
lien created by statute to secure rents due and rents that will become due under a lease
contract); Gollehon v. Porter, 161 S.W.2d 134, 136 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1942, writ
ref'd w.o.m.) (distress warrant may issue so long as lien continues, even if property has been
removed from rented building); Webb v. Bergin, 38 S.W. 841, 842 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1931, writ dism'd) (right to distress warrant may be exercised at any time before lien is lost).
"The purpose of a distress warrant is not to fix a lien, but to seize and secure property on
which the law has given a lien, that it may be sold in satisfaction of the debt or demand
secured by the existing lien." Marsalis v. Pitman, 68 Tex. 624, 625, 5 S.W.404, 406 (1887).
17. Compare Hunt v. Merchandise Mart, Inc., 391 S.W.2d 141, 143-45 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (contractual provision gave landlord lien on all of tenant's personal property situated on leased premises and prohibited removal of property
without prior consent of landlord until all back rent and any other sums of money to become due under the lease had been paid; legal remedy of distress warrant unavailable when
no rent or advances due; hence, landlord had right to injunction when tenant attempted to
remove property before end of lease term) with Gunst v. Dallas Trust & Say. Bank, 8
S.W.2d 806, 807 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1928, no writ) (contractual provision gave landlord
lien on "all goods, wares, chattels, implements, fixtures, furniture, tools, and other personal
property, which were then or should afterwards be placed upon the premises"; upon nonpayment of rent, landlord sued out a proper distress warrant on two pianos). Article 5236d,
section 4 provides that a contractual landlord's lien is enforceable only if it is "underlined or
printed in conspicuous bold print in the rental agreement." Tix. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art.
5236d, § 4 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
18. See TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 5227, 5239 (Vernon 1962).
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the tenant to make a crop" 19 on the leased land becomes due; secondly, when the tenant is about to leave the leased premises; or
finally when the tenant is about to remove the security for the
landlord's lien from the premises.26 When none of these conditions
obtains, however, no distress warrant will issue.21 The article 5239
distress warrant, enabling enforcement of an "owners of buildings
lien" by the owner of residential or commercial property, establishes the same three circumstances as article 5227, but adds the
additional requirement that the landlord make an affidavit and

bond.22 New rules 610 and 611 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure extend the bonding requirement to issuance of both kinds of
distress warrantsa

19. See id. art. 5222.
20. See id. art. 5227.
21. See Hunt v. Merchandise Mart, Inc., 391 S.W.2d 141, 144 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Watson. v. Corley, 226 S.W. 481, 482 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1920, no writ).
22. See Tzx. Rzv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5239 (Vernon 1962).
23. A landlord no longer has a common law or statutory self-help remedy by which to
obtain property of the tenant in satisfaction of unpaid rents. Such a remedy existed under
former article 5238a and was called a "baggage lien for rent." See 1969 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch.
686, §§ 1-7, at 2008. The statute was declared unconstitutional by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in 1972 on the authority of Fuentes as a deprivation of
property without due process of law because it denied "the right to a prior opportunity to be
heard before chattels are taken from their possessors." See Hall v. Garson, 468 F.2d 845, 847
(5th Cir. 1972). Although Fuentes is now thought not to apply to "self-help" repossession,
nonetheless the statute subsequently was repealed and replaced by article 5236c, which limits the residential landlord to changing the tenant's door locks "when the tenant's rentals
are in fact delinquent in whole or in part." When a landlord avails himself of this 'remedy,
however, he must also leave a written notice on the tenant's front door "describing the name
of the individual who will provide the tenant with such key; and such key shall be provided
regardless of whether the tenant pays any delinquent rentals." TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN.
art. 5236c (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981). See Michaux v. Koebig, 555 S.W.2d 171, 176 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no writ); Wallenstein, Property,Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28
Sw. L.J. 27, 59 (1974). Under present law, therefore, a landlord's lien, whether statutory or
contractual, does not, without consent or a specific contractual provision, authorize a residential landlord to take self-help possession of a tenant's personal property which is subject
to the lien. Judicial foreclosure is the only way remaining for a landlord to enforce his lien.
Furthermore, the landlord who avails himself of self-help possession of the tenant's property
is liable to the tenant in conversion. See McVea v. Verkins, 587 SAW.2d 526, 531 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1979, no writ); Schwulst v. Neely, 50 S.W. 608, 610 (Tex. Civ. App.
1899, no writ) (case decided before adoption of subsequently repealed article 5238a; therefore, holding should not be affected by adoption and repeal). The landlord and tenant may
still contract for self-help seizure of property to satisfy a landlord's lien, but article 5236d,
which replaced the "baggage lien for rent," sets strict limits on this remedy. Under section 5
it is stated that neither the landlord nor his agent may seize property defined in the statute
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Property Affected by the Lien

The landlord's lien statute, article 5222, gives the landlord a
"preference lien" on "animals, tools, and other property furnished
or caused to be furnished by the landlord to the tenant" and on
crops raised by the tenant on the rented land.2 ' The landlord's lien
extends to crops raised on the premises by a subtenant or assignee
of the tenant.2 5 The statute specifically withholds the landlord's
lien in cases where a tenant of agricultural land "furnishes everything except the land" and the landlord "charges a rental of more
than one-third of the value of the grain and more than one-fourth
of the value of the cotton raised on said land." In addition, the lien
is not available in cases where "the landlord furnishes everything
except the labor and the tenant furnishes the labor and the landlord directly or indirectly charges a rental of more than one-half
the value of the grain and more than one-half of the value of the
cotton raised on said land. .... ,,"'
The value of the lien granted by
article 5222 is equal to the value of "any rent that may become
due"; any money advanced to the tenant; "the value of all animals,
tools, provisions and supplies furnished or caused to be furnished
by the landlord to the tenant to make a crop on such premises;"
and the value of anything provided by the landlord enabling the
tenant to "gather, secure, house and put [his crops] in condition
2'
for marketing. 7
Under the terms of article 5223, the agricultural landlord's lien
on animals and tools furnished the tenant by the landlord and on
the tenant's crop is purportedly "superior to all laws exempting
such property from forced sale." 8 In contrast, under article 5238,

as exempt "under any circumstances." The landlord may, however, seize non-exempt property if such seizure is provided for in the written lease agreement. See TEx. REV. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 5236d, § 5 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981). It appears that under section 3 a residential
tenant cannot create an effective contractual landlord's lien in exempt property. See id. art.
5236d, § 3. For a discussion of the contractual landlord's lien and residential premises, see
note 39 infra and accompanying text.
24. See TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5222 (Vernon 1962).
25. See Forrest v. Durnell, 86 Tex. 647, 652, 26 S.W. 481, 483 (1894).
26. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5222 (Vernon 1962).
27. See id.

28. Id. art. 5223; see Stevens v. Cox, 255 S.W. 241, 242 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1923,
no writ) (when landlord sued out writ of attachment instead of distress warrant upon corn,
cotton, farm implements and hogs, and obtained a judgment foreclosing his landlord's lien,
the judgment was affirmed on the ground that no injury was worked on a tenant since his
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an "owners of buildings lien" has no effect on property exempt
from forced sale.se Moreover, under article 5236d, a landlord's lien
securing rentals of residential property has no effect on property
specifically exempted by section two of the same statute.3 0 Another
exception to the superiority of the landlord's lien is created by article 5224 which provides "[s]uch lien shall not attach to the goods,
wares and merchandise of a merchant, trader or mechanic, sold
and delivered in good faith in the regular course of business to the
tenant.""1 The Texas Supreme Court has determined that the
words "to the tenant" in this statute were intended by the legisla3' 2
ture to mean "by the tenant.
Article 5238, creating the "owners of buildings lien" referred to
above, was first enacted in 1879 as an amendment to the landlord's
lien statutes.3 " The purpose of the statute was to confer on the
owners of "residences and storehouses and other buildings occupied or used by tenants . . . the same rights and privileges as are
now conferred by law on other landlords." 4 The statute grants a
"preference lien upon all property of the tenant or of any subtenant" in the leased building and secures "rents due and to become
due" under the lease agreement.3 The statute imposes a filing re-

property exempt from execution was not exempt from the landlord's lien); TEX. REv. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art 3840 (Vernon 1966) (statutory exemption of personal property shall not apply to landlord's lien or other debts secured by liens on such property).
29. See, e.g., Hamberlin v. Aston, 114 Tex. 263, 270, 267 S.W. 684, 687 (1924) (tenant's
property exempt under exemption statutes is also exempt from claims for rent unless the
tenant mortgages or fixes a lien upon his exempt property himself); Commercial Credit
Corp. v. Patterson, 248 S.W.2d 965, 969 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1952, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (article 5238 lien does not extend to exempt property even when lease contained provision
giving landlord a statutory lien on the tenant's stock and fixtures located in the leased
building); McNabb v. Terminal Bldg. Corp., 93 S.W.2d 189, 190 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1936, writ ref'd) (landlord's lien does not extend to exempt property unless tenant expressly
mortgages specific property to landlord).
30. TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5236d, § 2 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
31. Id. art. 5224 (Vernon 1962).
32. See Freeman v. Collier Racket Co., 100 Tex. 475, 478, 101 S.W. 202, 203 (1907);
Marsalis v. Pitman, 68 Tex. 624, 627, 5 S.W. 404, 405 (1887).
33. See 1879 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 119, §§ 1-2, at 128, 8 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 1428
(1898).
34. Id.; see Marsalis v. Pitman, 68 Tex. 624, 627, 5 S.W. 404, 405 (1887); H.R.E., B. &
B. Ass'n v. Cochran, 60 Tex. 620, 623 (1884).
35. The Texas Supreme Court has construed this provision as limiting the security
value of the lien to the value of rents due or to accrue in the future but only under the
present term of the lease and not for any future term or period of holding over. See Couts v.
Spivey, 66 Tex. 267, 268, 17 S.W. 540, 540 (1886) (in tenancy from month-to-month with
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quirement when a landlord of commercial property wishes to secure his lien for rents more than six months overdue."
Article 5236d, enacted in 197387 as a replacement for the invalidated "baggage lien" law,88 overlaps article 5238 in that it applies
only to residential premises and provides its own list of exempt
property.3 e Although the new statute renders void any attempt to
waive exemptions granted therein,' it also provides for an enforceable contractual landlord's lien, 1 presumably in non-exempt
property."'

D. Duration of the Lien
The landlord's lien under article 5222 continues in the affected
notes given for future months' rent, no statutory lien exists to secure payment of rent for
months after the termination of the tenancy); H.R.E., B. & B. Ass'n v. Cochran, 60 Tex. 620,
624 (1884) (statute does not "impose a charge in advance. . . for any rents that might by
possibility become due for another term... whether such term be created by contract or
by the tenant's holding over").
36. See TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5238 (Vernon 1962). Article 5238 states, in part:
No lien for rent more than six (6) months past due upon any storehouse or other
building rented for commercial purposes shall be valid as against bona fide purchasers or unsecured or lien creditors of said tenant and/or subtenant, unless said statement shall be verified, filed and recorded as. . . provided [by this statute].
. . . The lien for rents to become due shall not continue or be enforced for a
longer period than the current contract years, it being intended by the term "current
contract years" to embrace a period of twelve (12) months, reckoning from the beginning of the lease or rental contract, whether the same be in the first or any other year
of such lease or rental contract. Such lien shall continue and be in force so long as the
tenant shall occupy the rental premises, and for one (1) month thereafter ....
Id.
37. See id. art. 5236d (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).,
38. See 1969 Ta. GaN. LAws, ch. 686, §§ 1-7, at 2008. See discussion of the former
article 5238a "baggage lien" at note 23 supra.
39. See Tax. Rav. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5236d, §§ 1-2 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981). Section
:two of the statute exempts, notwithstanding any other statute to the contrary, specified
fixtures and items of personal property including: tools used in a trade or business, one
automobile, certain items of household and kitchen furniture and utensils, all goods known
by the landlord to be subject to a chattel mortgage lien, and other articles. See id.; cf. id.
art. 3836 (exempts from forced sale certain items of personal property the value of which
does not exceed an aggregate fair market value ceiling established by the statute).
40. See id. art. 5236d.
41. See id. art. 5236d, § 4.
42. See generally Hamberlin v. Aston, 114 Tex. 263, 268, 267 S.W. 684, 686 (1924)
(under predecessor of article 3840 statutory exemptions yield to a debt secured by a lien
created by the owner of personal property); Tax. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3840 (Vernon
1966) (statutory exemptions do not apply "when the debt is due for rents or advances made
by a landlord to his tenant, or to other debts which are secured by a lien on such property").
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property until one month after the property is removed from the
rented premises, or, if agricultural products are placed in a stateregulated warehouse within thirty days of their removal from the
leased premises, the lien continues as long as the products remain
in the warehouse.4" The "owners of buildings lien" is limited to the
remaining term of the lease contract "so long as the tenant shall
occupy the rental premises, and for one . . . month thereafter
.
. "" The landlord's lien, moreover, must be prosecuted to
judgment of foreclosure in order to prevent waiver or abandonment.4 5 A landlord's grant of permission for a tenant to sell crops
subject to the lien has been held to constitute a waiver of the
lien." A quashing of a distress warrant and consequent return of
47
the property seized, however, does not impair the landlord's lien.
Furthermore, the landlord's acceptance of a third party's promise
to pay rents due does not constitute a release of his lien.4 8 A landlord, however, is not entitled to enforce his lien when the unpaid
rents secured by the lien are exceeded in value by a tenant's recovery of damages against his landlord for breach of the lease.4 '
E. Priority of the Landlord's Lien
As a general rule, the mere existence of a statute creating a landlord's lien constitutes constructive notice of the lien to all other
claimants of the tenant's personal property. 0 The lien is
subordinate, however, to pre-existing mortgages or security interests of which the landlord has actual or constructive notice;5 1 to
43. See TEx. R.v. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5223 (Vernon 1962).
44. Id. art. 5238.
45. See Wise v. Old, 57 Tex. 514, 515 (1882) (although property subject to landlord's
lien is seized under a distress warrant, decision to take a personal judgment without foreclosing landlord's lien waives the lien).
46. See Dill v. Graham, 530 S.W.2d 157, 160 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1975, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Woodson v. Westbrook, 272 S.W. 821, 822 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1925, writ

dism'd).
47. See Spann v. Trumpf, 83 S.W.2d 1043, 1045 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1935, no writ).
48. See Block, Oppenheimer & Co. v. Latham, 63 Tex. 414, 417 (1885).
49. See Graham Hotel Co. v. Garrett, 33 S.W.2d 522, 527 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1930, writ dism'd).
50. See Dill v. Graham, 530 S.W.2d 157, 160 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1975, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (landlord's lien created by article 5222); Shwiff v. City of Dallas, 327 S.W.2d 598, 601
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (owners of buildings lien created by article
5238).
51. See Bank of North America v. Kruger, 551 S.W.2d 63, 65-66 (Tex. Civ. App.-
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interests arising when the landlord's lien has expired;5 2 to subsequently created mortgages or security interests which are perfected
when no rents are due under the current lease term;" and to any
competing interest when the landlord's claim for rents more than
six months overdue on commercial property has not been recorded. 4 On the other hand, the landlord's lien statutes give constructive notice to, and create liability for conversion in a purchaser of crops from a tenant who lacks his landlord's consent to
sell,"6 in a tenant's creditor who sells crops under levy of execution,56 and in a purchaser of a tenant's
fixtures who buys within
57
term.
lease
a
of
end
the
of
days
thirty
F. Wrongful Distraint
Rule 610 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure requires the
plaintiff seeking a distress warrant to swear that such warrant is
not sued out for the purpose of vexing and harassing the defenHouston [lst Dist.] 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The court relied on section 9.104(2) of the Texas
Business and Commerce Code and article 5238 of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes. Id. at
65-66. See Radford v. Bacon Securities Co., 18 S.W.2d 848, 850 (Tex. Civ. App.- Eastland
1929, no writ) (applying pre-UCC law and article 5238).
52. See TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5223 (Vernon 1962) (landlord's lien continues
one month or as long as property remains in state-regulated warehouse if placed there
within thirty days of removal from rented premises); id. art. 5238 (owners of buildings lien
continues for one month after tenant removes from rented premises).
53. See H.R.E., B. & B. Ass'n v. Cochran, 60 Tex. 620, 623-24 (1884); Collins v. McFarland, 60 S.W.2d 334, 335 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1933, writ ref'd). An unrecorded contractual landlord's lien is "inchoate" and inferior to a subsequently perfected federal tax
lien. See United States v. Truss Tite, Inc., 285 F. Supp. 88, 92 (S.D. Tex. 1968).
54. See Industrial State Bank v. Oldham, 148 Tex. 126, 129, 221 S.W.2d 912, 913
(1949); Gunst v. Dallas Trust & Say. Bank, 8 S.W.2d 806, 808 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1928,
no writ); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5238 (Vernon 1962). See generally Bank of North
America v. Kruger, 551 S.W.2d 63, 66 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1977, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
55. See Templeman v. Gresham, 61 Tex. 50, 51-53 (1884); Dill v. Graham, 530 S.W.2d
157, 160 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
56. See Crider v. McIntyre, 20 S.W.2d 242, 243 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1929, writ
dism'd).
57. See Webb v. Bergin, 38 S.W.2d 841, 842 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1931, writ dism'd).
The Webb case is pre-UCC, but section 9.104(2) of the Texas Business and Commerce Code
specifically excludes landlord's liens from the purview of 'the code. It would seem, therefore,
that pre-code law still controls priorities involving landlord's liens although the code itself
now controls the manner of perfecting security interests in fixtures and other chattels. For
two cases illustrating the conflicts between landlord's liens and mortgaged fixtures, see
Shwiff v. City of Dallas,327 S.W.2d 598 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.) and
Lynch v. Cock, 195 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1946, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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dant.5 8 Revised rule 611 requires the execution of a bond in "an
amount approved by the justice of the peace. . conditioned that
the plaintiff will prosecute his suit to effect and pay all damages
and costs as may be adjudged against him for wrongfully suing out
such warrant." In contrast, former rule 611 required that the bond
be conditioned upon the plaintiff's payment of any damages sustained by the defendant "in case such warrant has been illegally
and unjustly sued out, . . . ,,9 and a warrant "illegally and un-

justly sued out" was held to be a warrant not in substantial compliance with the requirements of the statute nor based upon true
grounds in fact.6 0 The courts should interpret "wrongful" in new
rule 611 exactly as the term "illegally and unjustly" was interpreted in former rule 611.
The tenant can bring his action for damages in the distress proceedings 61 or in an independent action.62 Two instances of wrongful distraint giving rise to a cause of action for damages are the
making of false allegations in the landlord's affidavit as to the
amount of rent due, 3s and levying upon property not subject to the
landlord's lien.' The measure of damages recoverable by a tenant
for wrongful distraint is equal to the value of the use of the goods
levied on during the period in which they were removed from the
tenant's possession. 6 A landlord is not liable, however, for any illegal acts of the levying officer which result in damage to the tenant,
but which are not done under the distress warrant.6 6 In the case of
58. TEx. R. Civ. P. 610 (1981 amendment preserved this requirement).
59. Compare Tax. R. Civ. P. 611 with Tax. R. Civ. P. 611 (1978).

60. To the extent that an allegation of rent due exceeds the actual rent due, a distress
warrant is "illegally and unjustly sued out." See, e.g., McKee v. Sims, 92 Tex. 51, 53, 45
S.W. 564, 564 (1898); Hunt v. Merchandise Mart, Inc., 391 S.W.2d 141, 144 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.); McAfee v. Chandler, 7 S.W.2d 623, 624 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1928, no writ).
61. See Scott v. Byers, 275 S.W. 1088, 1088 (Tex.Civ. App.-Waco 1925, writ dism'd).
62. See McAfee v. Chandler, 7 S.W.2d 623, 624 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1928, no
writ).
63. See McKee v. Sims, 92 Tex. 51, 53, 45 S.W. 564, 564 (1898).
64. See Scott v. Byers, 275 S.W. 1088, 1088 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1925, writ dism'd)
(levy on tenant's exempt property by holder of owners of buildings lien gave rise to cause of
action for damages); Kingsley v. Schmicker, 60 S.W. 331, 332-33 (Tex. Civ. App. 1900, no
writ) (distraint of property known by landlord to belong to non-tenant gave rise to cause of
action for damages).

65. Scott v. Byers, 275 S.W. 1088, 1088 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1925, writ dism'd).
66. See Kimbrough v. Powell, 13 S.W.2d 467, 469 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1929, no
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crops seized under a distress warrant, the measure of damages for
wrongful distraint is the value of the crop seized and converted. 7
Exemplary damages for wrongful distraint are also recoverable if
the warrant is issued without probable cause and for the purpose
of vexing and harassing the tenant.6 8 A landlord, therefore, may be
held liable for exemplary damages when the levying officer seizes
exempt property at the landlord's direction. 9 The elements of exemplary damages recoverable for wrongful distraint may include
loss of business,7 0 attorney's fees,7 1 and the value of time spent and

expenses incurred by a tenant in regaining repossession of his
property wrongfully distrained7
G. The 1981 Rules-Distress Warrants
In the early 1970's distress warrant procedures came under attack as being violative of the due process requirements for prejudgment seizure imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment 8 as interpreted by several decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States.7" Furthermore, in 1975, the Texas distress warrant stat67. Majors v. Goodrich, 54 S.W. 919, 920 (Tex. Civ.,App. 1900, no writ).
68. See McAfee v. Chandler, 7 S.W.2d 623, 624 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1928, no
writ); Burger v. Rhiney, 42 S.W. 590, 592 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897, no writ); Smith v. Jones, 31
S.W. 306, 307 (Tex. Civ. App. 1895, no writ). See generally TEx. R. Civ. P. 610.
69. See White v. Stribling, 71 Tex. 108, 109, 9 S.W. 81, 82 (1888).
70. See Burger v. Rhiney, 42 S.W. 590, 591 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897, no writ).
71. See id. at 591.
72. See Watson v. Boswell, 61 S.W. 407, 409 (Tex. Civ. App. 1901, no writ); Smith v.
Jones, 31 S.W. 306, 307 (Tex. Civ. App. 1895, no writ).
73. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
74. See, e.g., North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 606 (1975);
Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 616-18 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 9697 (1972). See generally Soules, Attachment, Sequestration, and Garnishment: The 1977
Rules, 32 Sw. L.J. 753, 753-76 (1978). In Fuentes, Florida and Pennsylvania replevin statutes permitting ex parte prejudgment seizure of property were held to be unconstitutional
denials of due process. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 96-97 (1972). In Mitchell, however, a Louisiana sequestration statute that required a second creditor to justify issuance of
a prejudgment writ by establishing with sworn ex parte averments the probability of ultimate success and also afforded the debtor an early opportunity to put the creditor to his
proof before final deprivation of property was held constitutional. See Mitchell v. W.T.
Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 616-18 (1974). In the Di-Chem case the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a Georgia prejudgment garnishment statute that lacked the Mitchell protections.
See North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 607 (1974). The Court
abandoned the Fuentes holding that any deprivation of property by prejudgment seizure
without prior notice violated due process. See id. at 609 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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utes75 and related rules of civil procedure7 were held unconstitutional in Stevenson v. Cullen Center, Inc." A Houston court of
civil appeals noted that a distress warrant could be issued on mere
conclusory allegations in the applicant's affidavit and that opportu-

nity for a prompt post seizure hearing was not provided.7 8 The Su-

preme Court of Texas in response to these decisions revised the
entire rules system on distress warrants effective January 1, 1981.
A distress warrant is obtained by means of an application filed
with the justice of the peace."' The application can be filed at the
commencement of a suit or at any time during its progress. The
application may be supported by affidavits of the plaintiff, his
agent, his attorney, or other persons having knowledge of the relevant facts. The application must include a statement that the
amount sued for is rent or advances described by statute, or it
must contain a writing signed by the tenant to that effect. The
application must also include a sworn statement that the warrant
is not sued out for the purpose of vexing and harassing the defendant. Furthermore, the application must comply with all statutory
requirements 0 and must state the grounds for issuing the warrant
and the specific facts relied upon to warrant the required findings
by the justice of the peace.81
The affidavit setting forth grounds for the issuance of a distress
warrant must state that the amount sued for is rent or advances
and that the landlord has filed a bond conditioned upon the promise that he will prosecute his suit to effect and pay all damages and
costs that may be adjudged against him for wrongfully suing out
the distress warrant.82 Additionally, the affidavit must state that
one of three conditions exists: first, that rent or advances have become due; or second that the tenant is about to leave the leased
premises; or finally that the tenant is about to remove the security
for the landlord's lien from the premises. 8 Two or more grounds
75. See Tax. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts, 5227-5239 (Vernon 1962).
76. See Tax. R. Civ. P. 610-620.
77. 525 S.W.2d 731, 735 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, no writ).
78. See id. at 734-35.
79. See Tax. R. Civ. P. 610.
80. See Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts, 5222, 5238 (Vernon 1962); id. art. 5236a
(Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
81. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 610.
82. See id.
83. Cf. Tax. Rav. Cv. STAT. ANN. art. 5227 (Vernon 1962) (setting out three statutory
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may be stated conjunctively or disjunctively.8
The application for a distress warrant and any affidavits must be
made on personal knowledge setting forth such facts as would be
admissible in evidence. Facts may be stated based upon information and belief, however, if the grounds of such belief are specifically stated. The warrant, if issued, is made returnable to a court
having jurisdiction of the amount in controversy. No warrant can
be issued, however, before final judgment except on written order
of the justice of the peace after a hearing, which may be ex parte.
The justice of the peace, in granting the application, shall make
specific findings of fact to support the statutory grounds found to
exist, shall specify the maximum value of property that may be
seized, and the amount of bond required of plaintiff, and shall
command that the property be kept safe and preserved subject to
further orders of the court having jurisdiction.8"
The bond for a distress warrant required of the plaintiff shall be
in an amount which, in the opinion of the court, will compensate
the defendant adequately for all damages and costs which may be
adjudged against the plaintiff for wrongfully suing out the warrant
in the event the plaintiff fails to prosecute his suit to effect. 8' The
justice of the peace shall find in his order the amount of bond required to replevy which, except for the defendant's option provided in rule 614, will be the amount of plaintiff's claim, one year's
accrual of interest if allowed by law on the claim, and estimated
court costs. In addition, the order may direct the issuance of several warrants at the same time or in succession to be sent to different counties.8 No distress warrant, however, may be issued before
final judgment until the applicant has filed a bond payable to the
defendant in an amount approved by the justice of the peace with
sufficient surety or sureties as provided by statute. 8'
After notice to the opposite party, before or after issuance of the
warrant, either party may file a motion to increase or reduce the
amount of the plaintiff's distress warrant bond or to question the
sufficiency of his sureties, in a court having jurisdiction of the subconditions for issuance of distress warrant).
84. See Tx. R. Civ. P. 610.
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See Thx. R. Civ. P. 611.

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol12/iss3/15

14

Soules and Potter: Distress Warrant and Trial of Right of Property under the 1981 Te

DISTRESS WARRANTS

19811

ject matter. Upon hearing, that court shall enter its order with respect to such bond and sufficiency of the sureties.89
A distress warrant is directed to the sheriff or any constable in
the State of Texas. It commands him to attach and hold, unless
replevied, subject to further orders of the court having jurisdiction,
so much of the property of the defendant, not exempt by statute,
of reasonable value in approximately the amount fixed by the justice of the peace, as shall be found within his county.' 0 The defendant must be served with a copy of the distress warrant, the application, any accompanying affidavits, and orders of the justice of
the peace as soon as practicable following the levy of the warrant. 1
The following notice must be prominently displayed on the face of
the copy of the warrant served on the defendant:
To
, Defendant: You are hereby notified that certain
properties alleged to be owned by you have been seized. If you claim
any rights in such property, you are advised: 'YOU HAVE A
RIGHT TO REGAIN POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY BY
FILING A REPLEVY BOND. YOU HAVE A RIGHT TO SEEK
TO REGAIN POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY BY FILING
WITH THE
COURT A MOTION TO DISSOLVE THIS WARRANT.' 2
At any time before judgment, if the seized property has not been
previously claimed or sold, the defendant may replevy it, or any
part of it, or the proceeds of the sale of the property if it has been
sold under order of the court by giving a bond.o8 The replevin bond
must be made with sufficient surety or sureties as provided by statute, to be approved by a court having jurisdiction of the amount in
controversy and payable to plaintiff in double the amount of the
plaintiff's debt. At the defendant's option, however, the bond may
be for not less than the value of the property sought to be replevied plus one year's interest at the legal rate from the date of the
bond, conditioned that the defendant shall satisfy to the extent of
the penal amount of the bond any judgment which may be ren89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

See
See
See
See
See

id.
Thx. R. Civ. P. 612.
TEx. R. Civ. P. 613.
id.
TEx. R. Civ. P. 614.
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dered against him in such action."4
As with the distress warrant applicant's bond, either party has
the right to prompt judicial review of the amount of the replevin
bond required, denial of the bond, sufficiency of sureties, or estimated value of the property at issue.95 The court's determination
may be made upon the basis of uncontroverted affidavits, setting
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence; otherwise the
parties must submit evidence. An order either approving or modifying the requirements of the order of the justice of the peace is to
be promptly entered. This order will supersede and control all previous orders made with respect to such matters."
On reasonable notice to the plaintiff the defendant may move
the court to substitute property of equal value as that attached, for
the property seized. 7 If sufficient property of the defendant has
been located to satisfy the order of seizure, the court may authorize substitution of one or more items of the defendant's property
for all or part of the property seized. The court shall make findings
as to the value of the property to be substituted. If substitution is
granted, the property released must be delivered to the defendant,
if it is personal property, and all liens upon such property from the
original order of seizure or modification shall be terminated.
Seizure of substituted property will relate back to the date of levy
on the original property seized. No property, however, on which
liens have become affixed since the date of levy on the original
property may be substituted.' 8
A defendant whose property has been seized, or any intervening
claimant, may by sworn written motion seek to vacate, dissolve, or
modify the seizure and the order directing its issuance for any
grounds or cause, extrinsice or intrinsic. 9 Such motion shall admit
or deny each finding of the order directing the issuance of the warrant except when the movant is unable to admit or deny the finding, in which case the movant must set forth the reasons why he
cannot admit or deny. Unless the parties agree to an extension of
time the motion shall be heard promptly after reasonable notice to
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

See id.
Compare Tzx. R. Civ. P. 611 with TEx. R. Civ. P. 614.
See TEx. R. Civ. P. 614.
See id.
See id.
See TEX. R. Civ. P. 614a.

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol12/iss3/15

16

Soules and Potter: Distress Warrant and Trial of Right of Property under the 1981 Te

1981]

DISTRESS WARRANTS

the plaintiff, so that the issue will be determined not later than ten
days after the motion is filed. The filing of the motion will stay any
further proceedings under the warrant, except for an order concerning the care, preservation, or sale of any perishable property,
until a hearing is had and the issue is determined. The warrant
will be dissolved unless at such hearing the plaintiff proves the
specific facts alleged and the grounds relied upon for issuance, but
the court may modify the order of the justice of the peace granting
the warrant and the warrant issued pursuant to the order. The movant shall have the burden of proving, however, that the reasonable value of the property seized exceeds the amount necessary to
secure the debt, interest for one year, and probable costs. "He shall
also have the burden to prove the facts justifying substitution of
property."100
The court's determination may be made upon the basis of affidavits setting forth facts that could be admissible as evidence, but
additional evidence, if tendered by either party, will be received
and considered. 10 1 The court may make all such orders, including
orders concerning the care, preservation, or disposition of the
property (or the proceeds if the property has been sold) as justice
may require. If the movant has given a replevy bond, an order to
vacate or dissolve the warrant shall vacate the bond as well, discharging the sureties thereon. If the court merely modifies the order of the justice of the peace or the warrant issued pursuant to
the order, it will make further orders with respect to the bond consistent with the modification.102
When property levied on has not been claimed or replevied, the
judge to whose court the writ is made returnable may order the
property to be sold when it appears that the property is in danger
of serious and immediate waste or decay, or that keeping it until
trial will necessarily cause such expense or deterioration in value as
to lessen greatly the amount likely to be realized from its sale.103
The judge may act upon affidavits in writing or oral testimony and
may, by a preliminary order entered of record, with or without no100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 615 (sale of perishable property was not affected by the 1981
amendment to this rule).
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tice to the parties as the urgency of the case requires, direct the
sheriff or constable to sell the property at public auction for
cash.104 If a party other than the defendant applies for such order
of sale, the court may not grant the order unless the applicant files
with the court a bond payable to the defendant with two or more
sureties, approved by the court. Furthermore, such order shall be
conditioned so that the applicant will be responsible to the defendant for any damages he may sustain in case the sale has been
illegally and unjustly applied for or illegally and unjustly made. 10 5
The sale is to be conducted in the same manner as sales of personal property under execution, except that the time of sale and
time of advertisement of the sale may be fixed by the judge at a
time earlier than ten days according to the exigency of the case. ' 6
The officer making the sale shall promptly pay the proceeds to the
clerk of the court ordering the sale, or to the judge, and shall make
a written return of the order of sale with an itemized account of
the expenses attending the sale.107 The return must be signed by
the officer officially and filed with the papers of the case. 0 '
III.

TRIAL OF RIGHT OF PROPERTY

Trial of right of property is a statutory remedy 0' made available
to a third party claimant of personal property which has been levied upon, when the claimant is not a party to the writ under which
an original levy is made.110 The remedy was first adopted in Texas
104. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 616 (1981 amendments did not alter procedure to protect interests under this rule).
105. See id.
106. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 617 (procedure for sale of perishable property was left unaffected by the 1981 amendments to this rule).
107. See Tax. R. Civ. P. 618 (return shall also state the time and place of sale, the
name of the purchaser, and the amount of money received).
108. See id.
109. See TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts 7409, 7417, 7418 (Vernon 1960); Mx. R. Civ. P.
717-734.
110. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 717. The new rule begins with language as follows: "Whenever
a distress warrant, writ of execution, sequestration, attachment, or other like writ is levied
... . "Id. Although distress warrant was not mentioned in previous versions, it has historically been considered one of the "like" writs referred to in the statutes and rules. See, e.g.,
Wills Point Bank v. Bates, 76 Tex. 329, 331, 13 S.W. 309, 309 (1890); Livingstone v. Wright,
68 Tex. 706, 707, 5 S.W. 407, 407 (1887); Gorman Co. v. Jones, 245 S.W. 448, 449 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1922, no writ); Tax. R. Civ. P. 717 (1968). Garnishment, too, is a writ within
the contemplation of the rules for trial of right of property. See Voelkel-McLain Co. v. First
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by the Fourth Congress of the Texas Republic in 184011 and was
intended to provide a means of giving a claimant a "summary
method of asserting his title or right of possession, without resort
to an ordinary suit for a recovery of the property or its value." '
Upon compliance with rules 717 through 719 of the Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure a claimant can have the disputed property seized
and delivered into his possession. " The trial of right of property
will be docketed "in the original writ proceeding in the name of the
plaintiff in the writ as the plaintiff, and the claimant of the property as intervening claimant."11 4 Under former rule 725, the plaintiff in the writ and the claimant were required to proceed with
their trial of right of property before trial could be had in the main
suit between the levying plaintiff and his debtor. 15 When the writ
in the original suit failed, however, the claimant was no longer
bound to the plaintiff by his bond, and there could be no trial of
right of property. 6 Under new rule 723 the claimant's right to the
Nat'l Bank, 296 S.W. 970, 971 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927, no writ); Rodgers v. Murrary, 247 S.W.
888, 888 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1923, no writ).
111. See 1840 Tex. Gen. Laws, An Act To Establish the Method of Trying the Right of
Property Levied on by Execution, When the Property is Claimed by any Person Not a Party

To such Execution, at 64, 2 H.

GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS

238 (1898).

112. White v. Jacobs, 66 Tex. 462, 464, 1 S.W. 344, 345 (1886); cf. Osborn v.
Koenigheim, 57 Tex. 91, 95 (1882) (statute gives claimant "a simple remedy by which he
may protect both his title and possession"); Vickery v. Ward, 2 Tex. 212, 215 (1847) (statutory procedure for trying the right of property "is the most simple, and least expensive";
defendant may except to claimant's failure to use statutory mode of suit).
113. The statutes, however, are not the exclusive remedy. An aggrieved party may also
bring an action for wrongful taking of property regardless of the statute. See Brown & Co. v.
Rohr, 228 S.W.2d 322, 324 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1950, no writ).
114. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 723; cf. TEx. R. Civ. P. 725 (1966) (upon return of oath and
bond, trial of right of property was docketed "in the name of the plaintiff in the writ as the
plaintiff, and the claimant of the property as defendant.").
115. See Webb v. Bergin, 38 S.W.2d 841, 843 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1931, writ dism'd)
(landlord filed suit to foreclose landlord's lien; claimant delivered oath and bond and acquired possession of disputed property, thus instituting trial of right of property; therefore,
trial court in landlord's suit was "without authority to enter a judgment ... until the trial
of right of property suit was disposed of."); Pring v. Pratt, 1 S.W.2d 441, 445-46 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1927, writ dism'd) (previously, trial of right of property was to be had before
trial between original parties; trial of right of property was not ancillary to the original suit).
116. See Brown v. Collins, 77 Tex. 159, 162, 14 S.W. 173, 175 (1890) (landlord had
tenant's goods seized under distress warrant; claimant gave bond and received same goods
from sheriff; tenant had distress warrant quashed; landlord had judgment for debt but court
released goods distrained; when this action held error on appeal, trial court then rendered
judgment against claimant on his bond for trial of right of property in order to satisfy landlord's lien; held: because distress warrant was quashed, claimant was no longer bound by his
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property is tried in the main suit. Failure of the plaintiff's writ,
therefore, should result in the dismissal of the entire action and
17
the release of the claimant from his bond as to the plaintiff.
Once personal property is seized under the statutory procedure,
the officer must deliver that property to the claimant." 8 Under
new rule 717, the officer may not so deliver the property "except
on written order of the court after a hearing pursuant to [new]
Rule 718."9 Any party who has replevied property may not be
1 20
dispossessed except by order of a court following a hearing.
When the sheriff levies on an undivided interest in personal property by taking possession of the whole, this seizure is held to constitute an acknowledgment by the sheriff that the "claimant is entitled to possession of the property if he is the owner of the
interest levied upon. ''112 The claimant then has the right to proceed to a trial of right of property without joinder of the owner of
the other undivided interest. 2"

bond.).
117. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 723.
118. Stewart v. Howell Co., 264 S.W. 208, 210 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1924, writ ref'd)
(writ of attachment out of district court levied on shares of stock; writ of garnishment issued
against issuer of stock; claimant of stock procured bond through another district court; held:
officer receiving the affidavit and bond had a duty to deliver the property to the claimant).
The original statute of 1840 made no mention of the status of property delivered to a
claimant, and as a consequence, such property was subject to a continuing series of levies
under various writs. See Frieberg, Klein & Co. v. Elliott & Wright, 64 Tex. 367, 369 (1885);
1840 Tex. Gen. Laws, An Act To Establish the Method of Trying the Right of Property
Levied on by Execution, When the Property is Claimed by any Person Not a Party to such
Execution, at 64, 2 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 238 (1898). In 1887, however, the statute
was amended to read:
Upon the approval of such bond and delivery of the property to the claimant, the
same shall be deemed in custodia legis, and shall not be taken out of his possession
by any other like writ or writs, but said writs may be levied on the same by giving
notice to the claimant, and in such cases the claimant's bond shall also inure to the
benefit of the several plaintiffs in such writs according to their respective priorities.
1887 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 112, § 1, at 104-05, 9 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 902 (1898). See
Graham v. Thomas D. Murphy Co., 497 S.W.2d 639, 641 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1973,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Stewart v. Howell Co., 264 S.W. 208, 210 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1924,
writ ref'd). This rule remained in effect until the 1981 revisions. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 718
(1966). New rule 718, like the pre-1887 statutes, makes no mention of in custodia legis
status. See generally TEx. R. Civ. P. 718.
119. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 717, 718.
120. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 608 (attachment); TEX. R. Civ. P. 614a (distress warrant); TEx.
R. Civ. P. 664a (garnishment); TEx. R. Civ. P. 712a (sequestration).
121. See Hamburg v. Wood, 66 Tex. 168, 168, 18 S.W. 623, 623 (1886).
122. See id. at 168, 18 S.W. at 623-24.
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Availability of the Remedy

The nature of the claim necessary to entitle a claimant to a trial
of right of property has been the subject of considerable litigation.
The original statute of 1840 gave little guidance, speaking only of
the claimant's "claim" or "right. "123 Until the recent amendments
to the rules, these two terms were augmented only by the phrase

"authority and right" in rule 72411 and a caption added to rule

730 naming it "Failure to Establish Title."" The courts have held,
however, both before and since the addition of the caption that the
claimant need not prove up title to the disputed property, but
need prove only his right of possession."2s Among those who have
been found to have a right of possession and, therefore, grounds
for bringing a trial of right of property are a mortgagee out of possession whose mortgagor is in default" 7 and a claimant by estop123. See 1840 Tex. Gen. Laws, An Act To Establish the Method of Trying the Right of
Property Levied on by Execution, When the Property is Claimed by any Person Not a Party
to such Execution, at 64, 2 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OP TEXAS 238 (1898).
124. The rule states: "The plaintiff shall make a brief statement of the authority and
right by which he seeks to subject the property levied on to the process.
See TEx. R.
Civ. P. 724.
125. The caption itself first appeared as a marginal caption in the 1895 codification and
has been retained in the new rules. Compare TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5307 (Batts'
1895) with TEx. R. Civ. P. 730.
126. See White v. Jacobs, 66 Tex. 462, 464, 1 S.W. 344, 345 (1886) ("[I]t is not necessary that both ownership and possession should unite in the claimant.... Either the question of title in the claimant, or that of his right to hold possession of the property as against
defendant in the process, is what is to be tried. If either is found to exist in the claimant, he
must succeed in the suit ....

"); Bufkor, Inc. v. Star Jewelry Co., Inc., 552 S.W.2d 522, 524

(Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (one who has neither title nor right to
possession may not prevail in a trial of right of property); TEx. R. Civ. P. 730 (when claimant fails "to establish his right" to the property, judgment may be rendered against him).
127. See, e.g., Willis v. Satterfield, 85 Tex. 301, 307-08, 20 S.W. 155, 157 (1892) (one
purpose of statutes is to allow speedy determination of right to immediate possession of
property when claimant is entitled to possession against even true owner; at time of levy,
trustee under deed of trust on chattels was empowered to take immediate possession but
had not done so; trustee was still entitled to bring claim in trial of right of property); Osborn v. Koenigheim, 57 Tex. 91, 95 (1882) (pledgee who has received valid constructive delivery of pledged property may resort to trial of right of property if levy is made by officer's
taking possession of property, but if levy is made giving notice to pledgee in possession,
pledgee should "appeal to the equitable powers of the court."); Sanders v. Farrier, 271 S.W.
293, 296 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1924, writ dism'd) (mortgage on cattle gave mortgagee
right to take possession of cattle and sell them upon mortgagor's default; at time of levy of
attachment on cattle, mortgage was in default and hence mortgagee was "authorized to
bring the statutory action for the trial of the right of property, for he was legally entitled to
the possession of the cattle."); cf. Walter Connally & Co. v. Steger, 4 S.W.2d 83, 84 (Tex.
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pel. s5 New rule 718 states: "The claimant shall have the burden to
show superior right or title to the property claimed as against the
plaintiff and defendant in the writ." In all likelihood, this language
will not affect prior case law.
B. Burden of Proof
New rule 718, providing for a hearing when a claimant seeks possession of seized property, places the burden of proof at the initial
hearing upon the claimant. Rule 728 concerns placement of the
burden of proof at the trial of right of property proeeding itself,
now incorporated into the main suit on the plaintiff's writ. Under
this rule, if the property levied on was in the possession of the
claimant at the time of levy, the burden of proof is placed on the
plaintiff. 2 9 If the property is levied on while in the possession of
anyone else, however, the burden of proof is on the claimant.13 0
The Supreme Court of Texas has stated that the statutory rule of
burden of proof "was evidently intended to give effect
presumptions arising from the possession of chattels ...

to the
"131 If it

. . .

is difficult to determine who had possession of the property at the
time of levy, case law has established some guidelines a trial court
may follow. Appellate courts have suggested that the court may
direct placement of the burden of proof;, 2 that the plaintiff in the
Civ. App.-Texarkana 1928, no writ) (mortgagee out of possession had right to seize mort-

gaged property upon demand; failure to make demand before writ of execution levied deprived mortgagee of right to bring trial of right of property). The general rule, of course, is

that a mortgagee does not have the right of possession of the mortgaged property and hence
ordinarily cannot use the statutory remedy. See Wright v. Henderson, 12 Tex. 43, 44 (1854);
Bufkor, Inc. v. Star Jewelry Co., Inc., 552 S.W.2d 522, 524 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
128. See Lang v. Daugherty, 74 Tex. 226, 229-31, 12 S.W. 29, 31-33 (1889). In Lang levy
of execution was followed by sequestration rather than trial of right of property. All parties

except the execution plaintiff agreed that the sequestration plaintiff should take seized cattle in settlement of his claim, and the execution plaintiff acquiesced in vacation of his execution. Upon his attempt to levy on the same property again, the court held the execution
plaintiff was barred by his acquiescence and by his failure to apply for equitable relief
"against an improper preference of other creditors." Id. at 231, 12 S.W. at 33.
129. See Gus. Lewy & Co. v. Fischl., 65 Tex. 311, 319 (1886); TEx. R. Civ. P. 728. If the
property is in the possession of the claimant's agent at the time of levy, the burden of proof
remains with the plaintiff. King v. Sapp, 66 Tex. 519, 521, 2 S.W. 573, 574 (1886).

130. See Pierson v. Tom, 10 Tex. 145, 147 (1853); TEx. R. Civ. P. 728. The rule holds
true when the property is in the possession of the writ defendant's trustee or agent. See id.

131. Pan Handle Nat'l Bank v. Foster, 74 Tex. 514, 516, 12 S.W. 223, 224 (1889).
132. See Miller v. Sturm, 36 Tex. 291, 292 (1871-1872) (dictum); Continental Oil & Gas
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writ should automatically assume the burden of proof;1"' or that
the trial court may submit the question to the jury.""
C.

Trial of Right of Property and Other Remedies

Trial of right of property is not an exclusive remedy; a claimant
of property may forego the statutory remedy and sue in conversion 13 5 or seek an injunction"' if he can show the usual equitable
requirements, including the fact that trial of right of property affords him no adequate legal remedy.137 When a claimant does resort to the statutory remedy, however, he makes an election apparently waiving his privilege of suit at common law. 3 " Until the
recent rule change, there was some question whether a claimant
Prod. Co. v. Austin, 17 S.W.2d 1114, 1115 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1926, no writ);
Dawedoff v. Hooper, 190 S.W. 522, 525 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1916, no writ).
133. See Boaz v. Schneider, 69 Tex. 128, 130, 6 S.W. 402, 403 (1887).
134. Brown v. Lessing, 70 Tex. 544, 545, 7 S.W. 783, 784 (1888) (dictum).
135. See Lang v. Daugherty, 74 Tex. 226, 229, 12 S.W. 29, 31 (1889); Carmichael v.
Page, 32 S.W.2d 674, 675-76 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1930, writ ref'd). But see Vickery
v. Ward, 2 Tex. 212, 215 (1847) (when claimant attempts to bring suit to try right of property by petition and summons rather than under the statutory procedure, such suit would
be subject to exception by defendant).
136. The remedy of trial of right of property, it is important to remember, is available
only to claimants of personal property and not to claimants of real property or fixtures. See
Jones v. Bull, 90 Tex. 187, 191-92, 37 S.W. 1054, 1056-57 (1896) (trial of right of property
not available to claimant of fixtures, but when claimant himself causes fixtures to be severed
from the soil, thus rendering them personal property, those in ownership or possession of
the land may enforce the claimant's bond against the claimant and his sureties). A claimant
of land levied on, therefore, has no legal remedy in the trial of right of property and consequently, must resort to an injunction. See Hardy v. Broaddus, 35 Tex. 668, 670, 686 (18711872) (execution levied upon land as well as cotton, corn, and mules; so far as the land was
concerned, common law action for injunction would lie).
137. See, e.g., Long v. Castaneda, 475 S.W.2d 578, 582 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (when claimant is suing for damages as well as possession and when
priority of liens may have to be determined in trial, trial of right of property does not constitute an adequate legal remedy); Herndon v. Cocke, 138 S.W.2d 298, 300 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1940, no writ) (when property levied on was merchant's stock in trade and
fixtures and merchant was threatened with loss of his business as a result of levy, grant of
temporary injunction was proper); Berwald's, Inc. v. Brown, 69 S.W.2d 221, 222-23 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1934, no writ) (when damage resulting from the levy is not measured by
value of the property alone but includes incidental damages for loss of a business, legal
remedy of trial of right of property may be inadequate and injunction may lie). But see TEx.
R. Civ. P. 723 (under amended rule 723 the claimant is denominated "intervening claimant"
in the suit on the writ and thus may have an adequate legal remedy in some situations).
138. See Lang v. Daugherty, 74 Tex. 226, 228, 12 S.W. 29, 31 (1889); Moore v. Gammel,
13 Tex. 120, 122 (1854); Vaughn v. Porter, 44 S.W.2d 1009, 1011 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1931, no writ).
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could intervene in the suit on the writ under which levy was
made. 13 9 Under new rule 723, however, the claimant becomes the
"intervening claimant," and the trial of right of property is docketed in the original writ proceeding.
D.

Claimant's Failure to Establish His Claim

Following a prejudgment seizure and retention of property pending trial, a claimant's failure to prevail in his trial of right of property results in rendition of judgment against him and his sureties
for the value of the property140 plus interest from the date of his
bond."' Under rule 732, however, the unsuccessful claimant has
the option of returning the property within ten days of the judgment "in as good condition as he received it. ' 142 The return con-

templated by rule 732 is an actual return; a mere tender of the
property several miles from its location has been held not to be a
return within the meaning of the statute." ' Moreover, a statement
by a claimant's agent to the sheriff that the claimant wants to return the property has been held not to be a proper return.1 44 Furthermore, the claimant cannot satisfy the judgment against him by
returning part of the property and paying for the rest.14 Having
139. See Bassett v. Garthwaite, 22 Tex. 231, 233, 236 (1858) (bill of intervenor permitted in garnishment suit; point not raised on appeal); McAdow Motor Co. v. Luckett, 131
S.W.2d 267, 269 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1939, no writ) (trial court did not err in refusing
to strike intervention in sequestration suit; requirements for intervention, however, are different from those for trial of right of property). But see Whiteman v. Willis, 51 Tex. 421,
426 (1879) (dictum) ("it is, as a general rule, the proper practice to require parties to be
confined to . the trial of right of property"); Wilke v. Wilke, 220 S.W. 418, 418-19 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dalas 1920, no writ) (dictum) (intervenor in sequestration suit not proper;
claimant should use either trial of right of property or suit for conversion and damages).
140. The value to the time of levy is the proper estimate. See Gilmour v. Heinze, 85
Tex. 76, 79, 19 S.W. 1075, 1077 (1892).
141. See Tax. R. Civ. P. 732.
142. See Mardis v. Johnson, 43 Tex. 225, 226 (1875) (claimant's bond not forfeited until
the full ten day period for return of the property has expired); TEx. R. Civ. P. 732.
143. See Edwards v. Connolly, 61 Tex. 30, 32-33 (1884) (tender to sheriff, who was ten
or more miles from the property and therefore could not inspect it, held not sufficient; dictum to effect that a symbolic or constructive delivery might be sufficient in some cases).
144. See Garrity & Huey v. Thompson & Ohmstead, 67 Tex. 1, 3, 2 S.W. 750, 751
(1886) (when claimant's attorney's agent told deputy sheriff that attorney wished to return
property, but that it was in possession of a third party, such statement was "no more than
afnexpression of a wish to deliver the property").
145. See Cox v. Janes, 141 S.W. 326, 327 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1911, no writ) (since
statute is intended for benefit of claimant and his sureties, they must bring themselves
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properly returned the property, the unsuccessful claimant must
also pay the reasonable rental value of the. property for the period
of time he held it under his bond,14 6 costs, 1 47 and damages in the
amount of ten percent of the value of the property,14 8 or, if that
value exceeds the amount claimed in the creditor's writ, ten per14
cent of the latter amount. '
If the unsuccessful claimant fails to return the property within

ten days, the successful party or parties in the suit on the writ can
have execution of their judgment against the claimant.1 50 Although
rule 730 provides for judgment against the claimant "for the value
of the property," it also provides for fixing in the judgment the
amount of each successful party's claim.1 51 The effect of these provisions is to limit the recovery against the non-returning claimant
to the value of the property or the aggregate of all successful
claims, whichever is less, plus legal interest under rule 730 and
damages under articles 7417152 and 7418.158

within its provisions; returning part and offering to pay value of missing part does not constitute compliance with the statute); cf. Edwards v. Connolly, 61 Tex. 30, 32 (1884)
("[u]nder the law the whole of the property is to be returned.").
146. See Moore v. Rabb, 159 S.W. 85, 88 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1913, no writ)
(judgment should fix amount of rent so that claimant will know how much he must pay if he
elects to return property); TEx. R. Civ. P. 723.
147. Rule 719 indicates that costs are recoverable only when it is found that the claimant has wrongfully sued out his claim. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 719.
148. See Dupree v. Woodruff, 19 S.W. 469, 470 (1892); Moore v. Rabb, 159 S.W. 85, 88
(Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1913, no writ); TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 7417 (Vernon
1966); Tax. R. Civ. P. 732. The provision for damages in the amount of ten percent of the
value of the property presumably was intended as a statutory penalty. See Nunn v. Raby,
158 S.W. 187, 189 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dalas 1913, no writ).
149. See Dupree v. Woodruff, 19 S.W. 469, 470 (1892); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
7418 (Vernon 1966).
150. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 731.
151. See id. (providing for adjustment of priorities of claims when the total of such
claims exceeds the amount of the judgment).
152. Article 7417 states:
In all trials of the right of property under the provisions of this title, if the claimant shall fail to establish his right to the property, the court or justice trying the same
shall give judgment against all the obligors in the claimant's bond for ten percent
damages of the value of the property.

Tax. REV. Civ.

STAT. ANN.

art. 7417 (Vernon 1966).

153. Article 7418 states: "When such value is greater than the amount claimed under
the writ, by virtue of which such property was levied upon, the damages shall be on the
amount claimed under said writ." Id. art. 7418.

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

25

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 12 [2022], No. 3, Art. 15

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 12:693

E. The 1981 Rules-Trial of Right of Property
Responding to the due process requirements for prejudgment
seizure imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment, 1"' as interpreted
by the Supreme Court of the United States, 155 the Supreme Court
of Texas overhauled its rules pertaining to trial of right of property, effective January 1, 1981.
A trial of right of property is obtained by means of an application filed with the court in which the suit on the writ is pending.
The application that the claim is made in good faith may be supported by affidavits of the claimant, his agent, his attorney, or
other persons having knowledge of relevant facts and must comply
with all statutory requirements, stating the grounds for the claim
and the specific facts relied upon by the claimant to warrant the
required findings by the court.1 " The application and any affidavits must be made on personal knowledge setting forth such facts
as would be admissible in evidence, but facts may be stated based
and belief if the grounds of such belief are speupon information
57
1
cifically stated.

To obtain possession of the property levied on, a claimant must,
by sworn written motion, admit or deny each finding of the order
directing the issuance of the writ except when the claimant is unable to admit or deny the finding, in which case he must set forth
the reasons why he cannot admit or deny. 58s His motion must also
contain the reasons why the claimant has superior right to possession or title to the property claimed as against the plaintiff in the
writ. Unless the parties agree to an extension of time, the motion
shall be heard promptly after reasonable notice to the plaintiff,
which may be less than three days. The issue shall be determined
not later than ten days after the motion is filed. The filing of the
motion will stay any further proceedings under the writ until a
154. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
155. See North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 607-08 (1975);
Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 601 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 82-90
(1972); Soules, Attachment, Sequestration,and Garnishment: The 1977 Rules, 32 Sw. L.J.
753, 753-76 (1978).
156. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 717 (two or more grounds may be stated conjunctively or
disjunctively).
157. See id.
158. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 718.

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol12/iss3/15

26

Soules and Potter: Distress Warrant and Trial of Right of Property under the 1981 Te

1981]

DISTRESS WARRANTS

hearing is had and the issue determined.1 5 9 At the hearing the
claimant has the burden 1' show superior right or title to the property claimed as against the plaintiff and defendant in the writ. The
court's determination may be made upon the basis of affidavits, if
uncontroverted, setting forth such facts as would be admissible in
evidence, but additional evidence if tendered by either party can
be received and considered. 160
Before claimed property is delivered to the claimant he must file
with the levying officer a bond in an amount fixed by the court's
order and equal to double the value of the property claimed, payable to the plaintiff in the writ with sufficient surety or sureties as
provided by statute.1 ' If the claimant fails to return the property
and pay for the use of the property, then he must pay the plaintiff
the value of the property with legal interest from the date of the
bond and also pay all damages and costs that may be awarded
against him for wrongfully suing out his claim. 162 The plaintiff or
claimant may file a motion in the court in which suit is pending to
increase or reduce the amount of the bond or to question the sufficiency of the sureties. Upon a hearing the court will enter
an order
16 3
with respect to the bond and sufficiency of the sureties.
Trial of right of property is no longer a separate proceeding, but
is docketed in the original writ proceeding in the name of the
plaintiff in the writ as the plaintiff and the claimant of the property as intervening claimant. 1 After docketing and on the hearing
date set by the court, the court or justice shall enter an order directing the making and joinder of issues by the parties." 5 The issues must be in writing and signed by each party or his attorney.
The plaintiff is required to make a brief statement of the authority
and right by which he seeks to subject the property levied on to
the process. The claimant and other parties, in contrast, are only
159. Orders concerning the care, preservation, or sale of any perishable property may

be issued by the court even after the motion is filed. See id.
160. See id.
161. See Tax. R. Civ. P. 719. The bond must be conditioned that the claimant will
return the property to the officer in as good condition as he received it and that he shall pay
the reasonable value of the use, hire, increase, and fruits of the property from the date of
the bond. See id.
162. See Tx. R. Civ. P. 719.
163. See id.
164. See Tax. R. Crv. P. 723.
165. See Tix. R. Civ. P. 724.
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required to make brief statements of the nature of their claims.""
If the plaintiff appears and the claimant fails to appear, or neglects
or refuses to join issue within the time prescribed for pleading, the
plaintiff is entitled to a judgment by default. 1 7 If the plaintiff,
however, fails to appear a nonsuit will be entered against him. 168
The burden of proof in the trial of right of property is on the
plaintiff filing the writ, if the property was taken from the possession of the claimant pursuant to the original writ. 1 "9If the property
was taken from the possession of any person other than the claimant, however, the burden of proof is on the claimant.1 70 Furthermore, if the property is in the possession of the claimant's agent at
17 1
the time of levy, the burden of proof remains with the plaintiff.
Finally, when the property is in the possession of the writ defendant's trustee or agent the burden of proof is on the claimant.17 2
The rules provide that the proceedings and practice on the trial
of right of property shall be as similar as possible to other cases
before the court or justice hearing the cause.173 When the trial of
right of property is held in a county other than that in which the
original writ issued, the copy of the writ is received in evidence in
17
the same manner as the original would have been.
Following a prejudgment seizure and retention of property pending trial, a claimant's failure to prevail in his trial of right of property results in rendition of judgment against him and his sureties
for the property or the value of the property plus interest from the
date of his bond.17 5 The value of the property is determined as of
the time of levy.17 The officer receiving the claimant's application
and bond is required to endorse on the original writ the fact that a
claim has been made and application and bond given and by
whom, and to endorse on the claimant's bond the value of the
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id.
TEx. R. Civ. P. 725.
Thx. R. Civ. P. 726.
TEx. R. Civ. P. 728.
id.
King v. Sapp, 66 Tex. 519, 520, 2 S.W. 573, 574 (1886).
Pierson v. Tom, 10 Tex. 145, 147 (1853).
TEx. R. Civ. P. 727.
TEx. R. Civ. P. 729.
TEx. R. Civ. P. 719, 730.
Gilmour v. Heinze, 85 Tex. 76, 79, 19 S.W. 1075, 1077 (1892).
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property as assessed by the officer.17 7 The unsuccessful claimant
may either return the property within ten days of the judgment
"in as good condition as he received it" or pay the successful party
7
the value of the property plus interest."
If the unsuccessful claimant fails to return the property within
ten days, the successful party or parties can have execution of their
judgment against him.17 The judgment shall then fix the amount
of each successful party's claim, and provide for the adjustment of
priorities of claims when the total of such exceeds the amount of
the judgment.1 8 0 The. effect of these provisions is to limit the recovery against the non-returning claimant to the value of the property
or the aggregate of all successful claims, whichever is less, plus legal interest and damages. '
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Texas rules on the distress warrant and trial of right of
property remedies as revised meet all requisites of due process.
Care in using the remedies, however, must be exercised until the
courts affirmatively recognize that regardless of statutory infirmities, these rule revisions satisfy the due process requirements. Furthermore, until the legislature amends the pertinent statutes to excise procedural infirmities that may remain textually, even though
apparently cured by the revised rules, there may be some doubt
remaining as to the viability of the distress warrant and trial of
right of property remedies.

177. See Tax. R. Civ. P. 720.
178. See Tax. R. Civ. P. 719, 730, 731, 732. A claimant returning property must pay the
reasonable rental value of the property for the period of time it was held under bond. See
Moore v. Rabb, 159 S.W. 85, 88 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1913, no writ); TEx. R. Civ. P.

732. The claimant must also pay damages in the amount of ten percent of the value of the
property, or, if that amount exceeds the amount claimed in the creditor's original writ, then
ten percent of the latter amount. See Dupree v. Woodruff, 19 S.W. 469, 470 (1892); Moore v.
Rabb, 159 S.W. 85, 88 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1913, no writ); TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN.
arts. 7417-7418 (Vernon 1966); Tax. R. Civ. P. 732. Court costs may be charged against the
unsuccessful claimant. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 719, 732.

179. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 731.
180. See id.
181. See TEx. REv. CIv.

STAT. ANN.

arts. 7417-7418 (Vernon 1966); TEx. R. Civ. P. 730.
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